## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

CRIMINAL ACTION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11-082S

VS. SEPTEMBER 11, 2014

DONALD J. JONES, III PROVIDENCE, RI

## HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SMITH DISTRICT JUDGE

(Resentencing)

## **APPEARANCES:**

FOR THE GOVERNMENT: STEPHEN G. DAMBRUCH, AUSA

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11 SEPTEMBER 2014 -- 2:30 P.M.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is the matter of the United States versus Donald Jones. We're here for a resentencing this afternoon.

Let's begin by having counsel identify themselves for the record, please.

MR. DAMBRUCH: Your Honor, Stephen Dambruch, First Assistant United States Attorney, for the Government.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. Charles Tamuleviz on behalf of Mr. Jones.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

As everyone here knows, this matter was heard by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. They issued their opinion on April 30th, 2014, upholding the Defendant's conviction but noting that an error had been made in the imposition of sentence and remanding the case for resentencing consistent with the Court's opinion.

So I've subsequently received a revised Presentence Investigation Report from the Office of Probation, which is dated June 16th, 2014. And Mr. Tamuleviz, if you could just confirm that you've received that and that you've reviewed it with your client.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: I did receive it, your Honor,

and I have reviewed it with Mr. Jones.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Now, I understand you had a couple of objections to the presentence report; is that right?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Yes. Mr. Jones wishes to assert the objections set forth in the pleading I filed vesterday.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard any further on those?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Your Honor, I think I probably should make a brief argument on that.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Thank you.

It appears one of the objections -- I'm not going to do it in order, Judge, but one of the objections relates to the imposition of restitution in this case; but as I read the Government's response, they have not received any victim impact statements that would allow the Court to impose restitution in this -- at this resentencing so I think that one sort of speaks for itself.

With regard to the objection to the inclusion of links that was used in computing the total number of images for the guidelines computation, again, as I read the Government's response, they have accounted for or

taken out the number of links and the math still brings you to in excess of 5,000 images but, nevertheless, significantly less than the almost 8,000 that we started with.

Mr. Jones does wish to assert his objection to the enhancements that are set forth in paragraphs 26, 33 and 41, all of which are premised upon the age of the purported victim; and as the Court recalls in this case, the purported victim was a fictitious individual. There was no real victim. And Mr. Jones objects to the inclusion of those enhancements on that basis.

He also wishes to assert an argument that there was sentencing guideline manipulation inasmuch as those three enhancements I just mentioned were premised upon the age of the purported victim and that age was selected by the undercover agent during the course of the investigation.

And I believe, your Honor, that I've just covered the objections that have been asserted.

And as the Court, I believe, is aware from what I filed yesterday, Mr. Jones does reassert the objections that he put forth at the initial sentencing in this case other than the objections that related to the imposition of a life sentence, which is now not relevant.

THE COURT: But those were all heard by the Court of Appeals, right?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: I'm not sure if all of them were raised to the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: If they weren't raised before the Court of Appeals, then they're waived, aren't they?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Well, your Honor, I think inasmuch as this is a resentencing, they need to be -- if they're going to be raised they need to be re-raised again here. I don't think he's waived them in any way procedurally.

THE COURT: What are they then? Let's get all of your objections out on the table so that I can rule on them. I don't want to be in a position where you're just saying that all previously raised objections are made and then I don't make a ruling on them.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: I appreciate that, your Honor.

The first objection that was raised at the initial sentencing in Mr. Jones' initial sentencing memorandum was essentially that because he never directly communicated over the Internet with the victim that the adjustments or enhancements that he received regarding the use of the Internet, and I believe those are in paragraphs 16, 23 and 32 -- I'm sorry. I'm referring to the numbers in the initial presentence

Yes.

MR. TAMULEVIZ:

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THE COURT: All right. So that is what was

resolved by the Court of Appeals, so those issues are off the table.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Those are, yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I'll hear from Mr. Dambruch.

MR. DAMBRUCH: Your Honor, as to the objections newly raised yesterday by defense counsel, I did file a written response and I would rest upon that response to those objections.

As to the objection renewed today with regard to the enhancement relating to the Defendant's communication or use of the Internet, as I had argued at the initial sentencing and I would reassert here today, the guidelines make it clear that that particular provision applies not only to communication directly with the minor victim but also to a communication with a person who exercises custody, care or supervisory control over the minor, and that is set forth in Section 2A3.1 Comment Note 4(B), which makes it clear that communication with a person who at least purportedly exercises custody, care or supervisory control is sufficient. There need not be direct communication with the minor victim.

Also, your Honor, as I've reviewed in my objection filed yesterday, in my response filed

definition.

yesterday, I had previously covered in my objection to the Defendant's initial filings back at the time of the original sentencing, the guidelines also make it clear that when they use the term "minor" they are including both real and fictitious individuals in that particular

So for those reasons, your Honor, I would ask the Court to overrule each and every one of the Defendant's objections posed today.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Dambruch.

All right. Let me deal with these objections. I'll start with objections previously raised. I don't know if any of these objections are waived or not by virtue of the appeal, but I'm going to deal with them as if they're properly before me.

The previously raised objection dealing with the use of the Internet to entice or to coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, Mr. Dambruch is correct in citing the guidelines Section 2A3.1 in Comment 4(B), which states as follows: Subsection (b)(6)(B), which is the relevant subsection, is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care or supervisory control of the minor.

This would appear to fall directly into the language of Comment 4(B). So that objection is overruled. And that objection pertains to the enhancements at paragraphs 18, 25 and 34 of the revised presentence report.

Now, with respect to the new objections filed yesterday by the Defendant, I'll go through them one at a time.

The first objection relates to paragraph number 44 of the presentence report, which provides for a five-level upward adjustment because the subject offense involved more than 600 images of child pornography. As the Government sets forth in its objection, and this is really irrespective, I think, of whether the links were used or not, the evidence indicated that the Defendant possessed or transmitted a total of 76 videos and 112 images. There are also links to 28 additional videos. All of that would amount to 5700 images. Even without the links, the total number of images would be, according to the Government's memo, 5,812 images.

Now, do you disagree with that calculation, Mr. Tamuleviz?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: I do not disagree with the math, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. So if the calculation is correct and there doesn't appear to be any dispute about it, that would greatly exceed the number of images necessary to trigger the five-point adjustment. So that objection is denied.

Then there is the objection with respect to paragraph numbers 26, 33 and 41. This is the Defendant's argument that the victim, the minor victim in the case was not an actual person but was fictitious, and that the choice of the victim's age having been made by the Government agent amounts to sentencing manipulation. Each of these objections is The Government correctly points out in its objection that whether or not the minor was a real person is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the guideline enhancements in those paragraphs The guideline Sections 2G1.3 Comment Note 1 and then 2A3.1 all indicate that the victim may be real or fictitious. And the claim that the choice of the age by the agent is sentencing manipulation is also The Government points out the case of inappropriate. the **United States versus Barbour**: To establish a manipulation claim, the defendant must show the agents overpowered the free will of the defendant and caused him to commit a more serious offense than he was

predisposed to commit.

The evidence in this case was overwhelming with respect to the Defendant's desire to commit this crime. He was given multiple opportunities to withdraw from the crime and chose to continue forward. So there's no evidence that the Defendant's free will was overpowered in this case. So the sentencing manipulation objection is denied.

I believe that covers all of the Defendant's objections, doesn't it?

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Your Honor, except as to the restitution issue.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

Well, is the Government pursuing a restitution order?

MR. DAMBRUCH: Your Honor, I checked both with our victim witness person, Gail James, and also with Ms. Mattias from Probation. It's my understanding that no victim has submitted a request for restitution at this point in time.

THE COURT: All right. Well, given that, I don't think I'll be ordering a restitution amount.

MR. TAMULEVIZ: Very well.

THE COURT: All right. So all the objections have been dealt with so I'll now set forth on the

record the advisory guideline range as set forth in the new presentence report.

So we begin with Count I, the base offense level, this is the criminal sexual abuse, attempt to commit criminal sexual abuse under 2A3.1. The base offense level in this case is 38. There's a two-point upward adjustment because the Defendant used the computer to attempt to entice, coerce a minor to engage in the prohibited conduct. That yields an adjusted offense level of 40.

On Count II, promoting a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct with a minor, transportation, et cetera, in this case travel to engage in commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct with a minor, according to Subsection A3, the base offense level is 28 because the Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). There's a two-point upward adjustment because the Defendant used a computer in the commission of this crime. There's an eight-point upward adjustment because the offense involved a minor who had not yet attained the age of 12. That places the Defendant in -- gives the Defendant an adjusted offense level of 38.

Count III, the base offense level is a level 30. This is Title 18, U.S.C. 2423(b) and (f). There's a

four-point upward adjustment because the victim had not yet attained the age of 12 years old. There is a two-point upward adjustment because the Defendant used the computer, and that yields an adjusted offense level of 36.

Group 2 -- those first three counts are Group 1 under the grouping rules. Group 2 comprised of Counts IV and V. Counts IV and V are -- Count IV is the transportation of child pornography. Count V is the possession of child pornography.

Base offense level on Counts IV and V when they're grouped together under Section 3D1.2(d) is a level 22; a two-point upward adjustment because the child pornography involved material or involved prepubescent minors under the age of 12 years old.

There's a five-point upward adjustment because Defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. There's a two-point upward adjustment because the offense involved the use of a computer. There's a five-point upward adjustment because the offense involved more than 600 images. And that results in an adjusted offense level on Counts IV and V, Group 2, of 36.

Finally Count VI, which is an aggravated felony by a person required to register as a sex offender, the

guidelines provide Section 2A3.6 according to Subsection (b), if the Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 2260A, then the guideline sentence is the term of imprisonment required by the statute. The statute in this case requires a term of imprisonment of ten years and that sentence is required to be imposed consecutive to any sentence imposed for an offense enumerated under that section.

So the net of all this is set forth in paragraphs 51 and 52. 51 sets forth the combined offense level and describes the rules with respect to that. Counts I, II and III fall under this rule and yield a combined offense level of 41.

Paragraph 52 relates to the Defendant as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors and states as follows: According to Section 4B1.5, in any case in which the defendant's offense of conviction is a covered sex crime, Section 4B1.1, career offender does not apply and the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to obtaining at least one sex offense condition, the offense level should be the greater of the offense level determined under Chapters 2 and 3 are the offense level determined by the table at this section.

The Defendant's offense level determined under

Chapters 2 and 3 yielded a higher offense level, and so the offense level is level 41.

There's obviously no adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because this matter went to trial so the total offense level is 41.

The Defendant's criminal history is summarized in paragraph 61 of the presentence report. He has 9 criminal history points. Two points are added because he committed this offense while under a criminal justice sentence. That gives him 9 criminal history points and establishes a criminal history category of 4.

Section 4B1.5(a)(2) states the criminal history category shall be 5 if that is greater than determined under Chapter 4.

So this very complicated guideline calculation results in a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history offense category of 5. And as such, the Defendant's advisory guideline range is 360 months to life in prison plus 10 years consecutive on Count VI.

All right. I'll hear first from the Government with respect to the appropriate sentence.

MR. DAMBRUCH: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I suppose before you start I should note that in addition to the 10-year mandatory sentence

on Count VI, as I understand it, there is a mandatory 1 minimum term on Count I of no less than 30 years and a 2 3 minimum on Count II of not less than 10 years. MR. DAMBRUCH: Yes, your Honor. I believe also 4 5 on Counts IV and V there are minimum sentences as well of 15 and 10 years as I read the presentence report. 6 7 THE COURT: I think that's right. 8 MR. DAMBRUCH: And Judge, just for 9 clarification, it's my understanding that Count VI was 10 not sent back for resentencing. 11 THE COURT: Well, I suppose that's right. Ιt 12 does say that. So I think it's six of one, half dozen 13 of the other. The previously imposed sentence of ten 14 years on Count VI still stands. 15 MR. DAMBRUCH: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: So whatever sentence I impose, that 17 ten-year sentence is consecutive to the sentence I 18 impose today. 19 MR. DAMBRUCH: Understood, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. DAMBRUCH: Your Honor, I reviewed the 22 sentencing transcript from the last time we were here, 23 and obviously because of the understanding that the

life sentence was mandatory, there was little or no

argument with regard to what an appropriate sentence

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for this Defendant would be.

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As I looked over the materials, certainly I can't say that a life sentence is inappropriate, but considering the travel of this case, I don't today feel comfortable re-recommending a life sentence. However, I do believe that a significant sentence is warranted not only because the guideline range is 360 months to life, but because of the nature of the conduct involved and the character and history of the person before the Court.

Coming back into this courtroom once again in the presence of Mr. Jones, it's hard to get out of my head the revulsion and disgust that I felt as we sat here day after day and listened to an individual describe in excruciating and disgusting detail the plans he had for a nine-year-old little girl. getting beyond just the disgust and revulsion that those conversations brought to mind, I guess the other and probably more longstanding reaction to those conversations and all of the other evidence is It's chilling to know that in this chilling. particular case before you now, your Honor, we have a true child predator, a committed predator, who throughout his adult life, certainly since his initial conviction of aggravated sexual assault in 1993, has

yet another child.

made it his mission to prey upon young children; a person who the system has tried to deter from that conduct by sentencing him to ten years of incarceration, then releasing him on parole which he violated twice, sending him back to prison again for various other child sex-related offenses, whether it's possession of child pornography. He violated probation in 2006 again. And then here, fortunately, was detected by the Postal Inspection Service and Homeland

Security investigations before he was able to victimize

As difficult as it is to acknowledge because our system is really built upon multiple prongs, punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation, with regard to this particular Defendant, Judge, I think rehabilitation is out the window. This Defendant is simply beyond rehabilitation. I say that based upon the evidence in this case and the Defendant's criminal history.

With regard to punishment, he should be punished. He engaged in abhorrent behavior that deserves the most serious punishment. But it's the last prong of the sentencing consideration that I'd like to focus on, and that's deterrence. Because in this particular case there's general deterrence and,

obviously, a long sentence will hopefully deter others from engaging in similar conduct, but it's more the specific deterrence of Mr. Jones that forms the basis of my recommendation, and I would urge the Court to inform the basis of the Court accepting that recommendation in imposing the sentence that's recommended by the Government.

And that simply is that, Judge, the only way to prevent Mr. Jones from victimizing another child is to lock him up and keep him in prison where he can't have access to another child because this Defendant's history shows that whenever he walks out of those prison doors, whenever a child is available to him whether it's working through a church group or he's in a home with children or he's on the Internet attempting to convince a parent to allow him access to their young child, no child is actually safe from this Defendant.

Based upon all that, your Honor, I'm recommending a sentence as to Count I of 45 years incarceration. As to Count II, 45 years incarceration. As to Count III, 30 years incarceration, which is the maximum statutory penalty. As to Count IV, 40 years incarceration, which again is the maximum statutory penalty; and as to Count V, 20 years incarceration, which is the maximum statutory penalty and obviously

the sentence previously imposed in Count VI, the ten-year sentence run consecutive.

Your Honor, I would argue to the Court that sentence is within the guideline range; and secondly, it's warranted based upon the facts of this case and the Defendant's criminal history. Thank you.

THE COURT: Your argument would be that those sentences on Counts I through V should be imposed concurrently.

MR. DAMBRUCH: That's correct, your Honor. I apologize for not clarifying that.

THE COURT: That's fine.

Now, just a question with respect to supervised release. Obviously, if I adopt your recommendation or something close to it, this may be a moot point given the Defendant's age, but do you believe it would be necessary for me to impose all the usual conditions that I impose on sex offenders during a term of supervised release?

MR. DAMBRUCH: I do, your Honor. And I say that only because we can't predict the future and we don't know if some time down the line parole may be reinstituted or the Defendant may be granted early release because of a medical condition by a warden. So there's a lot of things that could happen. I'm not

saying they will happen, but because we can't predict that I would urge the Court to impose actually a term of life supervised release with the appropriate conditions attached thereto.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Tamuleviz.

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MR. TAMULEVIZ: Your Honor, given where the statutory framework puts us, by my calculation the minimum amount of time that the Court can sentence Mr. Jones to would be -- would work out to a total of 40 years, the 30-year mandatory minimum on Count I, with Counts II through V being ordered to run consecutive to that, and then Count VI with the mandatory ten-year consecutive. So at a minimum, what we're talking about is 40 years. And I think when you consider the factors that even Mr. Dambruch discussed earlier, given Mr. Jones' age, he's 50 years old now, in 40 years he's going to be 90, that anything beyond that, beyond that minimum really comes down to overkill. He would be 90 years old when he gets out if you give him the minimum penalties that you can impose here.

And Mr. Jones is suggesting just that, that you impose the sentence on Count I of 30 years and then on the Counts II through V, whatever you choose, anything

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up to 30 years but -- and that's permissible by statute, but run them all concurrently as the Government recommended, and Count VI is ten years mandatory consecutive on top of the 30 for Count I. That's 40 years.

And in this case, your Honor, I would ask you to consider that there was no real victim here, no live There was no touching by the Defendant. And you heard his explanation during the trial from his interview that was recorded. Forty years for that is more than sufficient to accomplish the goals set forth in Section 3553, Judge. He'll be 90 years old when he's done with it.

So for those reasons, Judge, that's our recommendation.

Mr. Jones did want me to state specifically on the record that by making that recommendation he is in no way waiving any rights he may have to appeal any sentencing issues related to the case.

> Thank you, Mr. Tamuleviz. THE COURT:

Mr. Jones, do you wish to say anything before I impose sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I know that this is a bad case. And I know -- I know I did some things that were wrong. 0kay?

I do want to put for the record, okay, that through all my conversations that I had with the agent I never made plans to do anything. He made plans and I agreed with him. Okay? All the stories that I told him were made up, which there was nobody could find any victims anywhere because I made them up.

He's talking about a church group. I've never touched anybody. I had one incident where I touched somebody in 1991. I have never even thought about it. I didn't lie about it then. I went to trial and told the truth. I touched somebody. They offered me a three-year plea bargain. I could have took it, but I wanted to tell the truth. I did touch somebody. It wasn't in a sexual context. When I did it, I did it. I knew it was wrong and I knew that it was an accident, but people don't understand accidents. So I went in the Army, and I left. I was gone. I got arrested while I was in the Army.

I never tried to run from anything I did. Okay? Never tried to give excuses for anything I've done. Whatever I've done, I've done it. All I can say is that even from the beginning of this I never intended to harm or touch anyone. My explanation on the original audio from the police station I thought was clear enough on that, but I guess not. Whatever the

Court gives, I have to accept it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Jones. You can remain standing.

You have obviously convinced yourself of your innocence and of your righteousness here, but the simple fact is I don't believe it. And I think the evidence in the case overwhelmingly proves that what you're saying to me here today is not true.

You can talk yourself into anything that you want to, but the evidence was just overwhelming. It was clear to me what you were coming to Rhode Island to do and what you hoped to do, and the agent gave you the opportunity to do it and you took that opportunity.

I don't know whether what you talked about in those phone conversations about what you had done previously was true or not. You say now that none of it was true; you were making it up. I just don't believe you, and I think Mr. Dambruch has correctly summed it up. I think you're a child predator. I think if you're given the opportunity to be free, you will pursue children the way you have in the past, and I don't think there's really any solution to the problem that you present other than a very long prison sentence. And as we know, that's required by the statute.

So I think all of the sentencing factors in this case argue in favor of or require a very substantial prison sentence. Now, the question really is do I sentence you to life in prison or not. I thought about this and I tend to agree with what Mr. Dambruch suggests and really in a way what Mr. Tamuleviz is suggesting, that a sentence of life imprisonment, which of course in the federal system means life in prison, is not called for. Whether that's any different as a practical matter than what I'm going to impose or what the statute requires, it may not be, but I think these differences in terms of a sentence of a specific number of years versus a sentence of life, they are important.

So I'm not going to impose life imprisonment. I'm going to give you a term of incarceration and the term that I'm going to give you is 40 years. That will be in addition to the ten years on Count VI that is not before me in this sentencing hearing.

I think a term of 40 years with a total term of 50 years is the appropriate term that's called for by the nature of the crimes that you were convicted of. It takes into consideration your nature and circumstances as a defendant. It provides for, very importantly, protection of the public. Probably more important than any other factor under Section 3553 is

protection of the public and deterrence of you as an individual offender from committing a crime like this or preying on children in the future. It also serves the goal, sentencing goal of general deterrence. And it is sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve all of those goals.

So that's the sentence that I am going to impose. I'm further going to impose a variety of conditions on your term of supervised release, which will be life.

As we have previously discussed, there's not going to be any restitution in this case, nor any fine.

So in the matter of the United States versus

Donald Jones, III, the Defendant is hereby sentenced to
a term of incarceration of 40 years on Counts I and II,
30 years on Count III, 40 years on Count IV, 20 years
on Count V, all concurrent with each other.

This, of course, is in addition to the ten years previously imposed on Count VI for a total term of incarceration in both of 50 years.

Further, the Defendant, following his term of incarceration, shall serve a term of supervised release of life. There will be no restitution and there is no fine in this case. There is a special assessment of \$600.

Now, in addition to the standard conditions of

supervised release, the following special conditions

will be imposed: The Defendant shall comply with all

applicable federal and state laws regarding the

registration of sex offenders in his state of

residence, employment and school attendance and shall

provide for verification of compliance with this

requirement to the probation officer.

Number two, the Defendant shall participate in a sex offender-specific treatment program as directed by the probation officer and shall contribute to the cost of that treatment based on his ability to pay as determined by the Probation Office.

Third, the Defendant shall participate in testing in the form of polygraphs or other methodology that are approved by the Court to ensure compliance of the conditions of his treatment and supervised release and shall contribute to the cost of that testing based on his ability to pay.

Fourth, the Defendant shall permit a probation officer who may be accompanied by either local, state or federal law enforcement authorities upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of his conditions of supervision to conduct a search of the Defendant's residence, automobile, workplace and computer and/or

other electronic communication or data storage devices or media.

Fifth, the Defendant must submit to unannounced examination of his computer or other electronic equipment by the probation officer who may be accompanied by either local, state or federal law enforcement authorities, which may include retrieval and copying of all data from the computer to ensure compliance with the condition.

In addition, the Defendant must consent to the removal of such equipment for the purpose of conducting a more thorough investigation and must allow at the discretion of the probation officer the installation on the Defendant's computer of any hardware or software system necessary to monitor his or her computer use.

Number six, the Defendant shall have no contact with any child under the age of 18 without the presence of an adult who is aware of the Defendant's criminal history and who is approved in advance by the probation officer.

Seventh, the Defendant shall not loiter in areas where children congregate. These areas include but are not limited to schools, daycare centers, playgrounds, arcades, amusement parks, recreation parks and youth sporting events.

Number eight, the Defendant shall not be employed in any occupation, business or profession or participate in any volunteer activity where there is access to children under the age of 18 unless he is authorized in advance by the probation officer.

Number nine, the Defendant shall live at a residence approved by the Probation Office and not reside with anyone under the age of 18 unless approved in advance by the Probation Office.

Number ten, the Defendant shall not use, possess, procure or otherwise obtain any electronic device that can be linked to any computer networks, bulletin boards, Internet service providers or exchange formats involving computers.

And finally, the Defendant shall not maintain a post office box unless approved by the probation officer, and he shall report all mailing addresses used by him and immediately report any changes. In addition, the Defendant shall not receive any prohibited items by mail at any of these locations.

All right. I think I've previously stated there's no restitution and no fine. There's a special assessment.

I do need to advise you, Mr. Jones, that you have the right to appeal the sentence I've just imposed

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      on you. If you wish to appeal, you need to be aware
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      that you have to file your appeal within 14 days of the
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      entry of the judgment. Mr. Tamuleviz can assist you
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      with that if you wish.
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              Is there anything further?
              MR. DAMBRUCH: Not that the Government is aware
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      of.
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              THE COURT: Is there anything further,
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      Mr. Tamuleviz?
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              MR. TAMULEVIZ: No, sir.
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              THE COURT: Then we'll be in recess.
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              (Court concluded at 3:20 p.m.)
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## <u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I, Anne M. Clayton, RPR, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the above-entitled case.

/s/ Anne M. Clayton
----Anne M. Clayton, RPR

December 15, 2014

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Date